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Why do some countries protect minority shareholders from rent-seeking
by corporate insiders while others do not? To the extent that there has
been convergence toward shareholder-friendly laws, what factors have
shaped that convergence? We explore this question by examining the
worldwide diffusion of insider trading laws through a series of event his-
tory analyses. We argue that variation in the adoption and enforcement in
insider trading laws can be best explained by the interaction of rising
international competitive pressures to attract investment capital through
investor-friendly laws and electoral laws that make governments more or
less vulnerable to economic voting. We find that governments are more
likely to adopt and enforce insider trading laws when they face reelection
under electoral laws that make them relatively vulnerable to economic
voting and when they face international competitive pressures. Moreover,
we find that the impact of domestic political institutions declines in signif-
icance as international competitive pressures increase, and vice-versa.
States vary widely in the extent to which they protect minority shareholders from
rent-seeking by corporate insiders—that is, managers, directors, and controlling
shareholders. To illustrate this variation, Figure 1 shows the 2009 rankings of
investor protection among high-income democracies as complied and reported
by the Doing Business project of the World Bank.1 These ratings were compiled
for 178 countries at various development levels. As can be seen, there is consid-
erable variation, even among high-income democracies. Some countries—
Netherlands, Austria, Greece, and Switzerland—not only lag behind other
high-income democracies, they are among the lowest in the world. This variation is
puzzling given the general consensus among economists and policymakers that
protecting investor rights contributes positively to financial market development
by, for example, encouraging higher share prices, greater capital market liquid-
ity, larger initial public offerings, and more entry by new firms.2 Economists have
1 The Investor Protection Index is composed of three subindices: mandatory disclosure of related party transac-
tions, the extent of legal liability for company directors, and the legal standing of shareholders in the event of a vio-
lation. Available at http://www.doingbusiness.org.
2 For several prominent examples see La Porta et al. (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny
(1997, 1998, 2000), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Castro, Luca Clementi, and MacDonald (2004), Tiberghein (2007),
Bebchuk and Neeman (forthcoming), Perotti and Volpin (2004, 2007) and Beny (2008).
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further argued that the financial development engendered by investor protec-
tions is an important source of national comparative advantage and long-term
economic growth.3 In light of all these benefits, what explains cross-national vari-
ation in the provision of investor protections?
Extant answers to this question focus primarily on political competition
between domestic interest groups. Interest group theories begin with observation
that the benefits accrued from investor protections come at the expense of cor-
porate insiders, whose rent-seeking opportunities are constrained by the adop-
tion and enforcement of these laws. Preferences diverge as a result; insiders
typically oppose high levels of investor protection while outsiders investors sup-
port it. Interest group theories have looked to domestic political institutions,
and electoral rules in particular, to explain how these competing preferences are
translated into policy.4
A great deal of empirical evidence has shown that domestic political institu-
tions influence politicians’ incentives to adopt and enforce investor protections.
However, this literature’s focus on largely time-invariant institutions means that
these theories cannot account for the significant variation within states over time
(Rajan and Zingales 2003). Insider trading laws are just one example of a policy
that exhibits considerable variation over time. Of the 51 states with active stock
markets in 1965, only the United States banned insider trading. By 1999, this
number had grown to 87 out of 103 stock markets. Domestic institutions alone
cannot explain this trend. We believe that the key component missing from
these theories is sufficient account of the role played by international com-
petitive pressures and, in particular, how these pressures interact with domestic
institutions.
Recent literature on mechanisms of global policy diffusion has shown that
competition over capital can help explain the proliferation of liberal market
policies (Simmons and Elkins 2004; Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons 2006). We
draw upon these findings to argue that competition over internationally mobile
capital—portfolio investment from either domestic or foreign sources—creates
material incentives for governments to adopt investor protections.5 In related
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FIG 1. World Ranking of Investor Protection
3 See Becker and Greenberg (2003), Demirgu¨c¸-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), King and Levine (1993), Beck,
Levine, and Loayza (2000) and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2005).
4 Among the works making this argument are Bebchuk and Neeman (forthcoming), Roe (2003), Gourevitch
and Shinn (2005), La Porta, et al. (1997), Pagano and Volpin (2005), Perotti and Volpin (2007).
5 Note that we do not consider foreign direct investors in this analysis, who may benefit from rent-seeking
opportunities stemming from their controlling share in the firm they invest in.
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work, Basinger and Hallerberg (2004), Brooks (2005, 2007) and others that have
noted the mediating effect domestic institutions have on competitive diffusion
processes. We therefore expect competitive pressures and domestic political insti-
tutions to condition one another. To motivate our hypotheses, we start with the
observation that a government’s tenure security is closely tied to economic per-
formance and that governments that adopt suboptimal policies are more likely
to face public sanction (Hibbs 2000). Because the preferences of corporate insid-
ers diverge from those of minority shareholders and the general public—’’outsid-
ers’’—the decision of whether to ban insider trading reflects a trade-off between
competing interests. In practice, politicians balance the financial contributions
made by corporate insiders and the votes that accrue, directly or indirectly, from
market performance.
Accordingly, we argue that the incentives to protect investor rights increase
in the public accountability of politicians. Accountability is highest under two
conditions: (i) when investor protections have a large impact on economic per-
formance and, thus, on votes; and (ii) when votes have a relatively large impact
on the likelihood of politicians retaining office relative to financial contribu-
tions. On the first point we see a clear role for international competitive pres-
sures. Policy decisions relating to investor protection affect states’ abilities to
attract internationally mobile portfolio capital. Countries that permit rent-seek-
ing find it more difficult to attract capital from risk-averse investors, particularly
when there are comparable markets where investors can avoid rent-seeking.
The adverse welfare consequences of losing investment capital include erosion
of the tax base, the accumulation of external debt, depressed share prices and,
most importantly for voters, reductions in personal income (Alesina and Tabel-
lini 1988; Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo 2001). All of these undesirable effects
place pressure on governments to adopt and enforce investor protections. On
the second point we follow Rogowski and Kayser’s (2002) finding that marginal
shifts in vote share have a greater impact on the likelihood of retaining office
when governments face reelection under majoritarian, rather than propor-
tional, electoral rules.
We test our hypotheses through a series of event-history analyses that focus on
the adoption and initial enforcement of insider trading laws. Analyzing both out-
comes gives us confidence that we are measuring meaningful policy changes, not
just inconsequential changes to laws on the books, particularly in light of empiri-
cal evidence that enforcement, rather than adoption, eases investor fears over
rent-seeking (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002; Bushman, Piotroski, and Smith
2005). Consistent with our expectations, we find that governments are more
likely to adopt and enforce insider trading laws under majoritarian electoral
rules, but that this relationship is attenuated as competitive pressures increase.
We also find that competitive pressures increase the likelihood that a country
adopts and enforces an insider trading law but that this relationship is attenu-
ated in countries with majoritarian electoral rules, in which even modest pres-
sure will be sufficient to cause governments to ban insider trading.
This article makes three important contributions. First, by incorporating
international competition into our theory of investor protection, we provide a
framework that is more encompassing and better fits the data than do extant
models that focus overwhelmingly, if not solely, on domestic politics. Second,
our study of insider trading laws allows us to observe the precise political-eco-
nomic conditions in place at the time of policy change over a span of nearly
50 years, over which time we can observe nearly the full universe of insider
trading law adoption and initial enforcement events. This stands in sharp con-
trast to—and, we think, is a considerable improvement on—extant statistical
work on investor protections that relies on either cross-sectional data, or rela-
tively short time-series with very little variation over time. Third, this paper
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contributes to the broader literature on policy diffusion. We find that competi-
tive pressures, particularly those that come from the policy decisions in coun-
tries with similar levels of development, are a key source of policy pressure.
Moreover, we find that the competitive diffusion process that has defined the
spread of insider trading laws cannot be meaningfully interpreted without ref-
erence to domestic politics.
Literature Review
Interest group theories are currently the dominant perspective on investor pro-
tection.6 This literature focuses on competition between domestic inter-
ests—typically: corporate insiders, labor, and minority shareholders—for whom
the provision of investor protections has significant distributional implications.
Preferences over policy are assumed to diverge among these groups. Investor
protections are opposed by insiders and, typically, labor. Insiders oppose pro-
tections because they reduce insiders’ rent-seeking opportunities—for example,
unduly high executive compensation plans, asset-stripping, insider trading,
etc.—and because they expose incumbent firms to increased competition from
entrepreneurs with easier access to investment capital (Rajan and Zingales
2003; Perotti and Volpin 2007). Labor is typically thought to oppose investor
protection because a greater emphasis on shareholder value can place down-
ward pressure on the wage bill, either through pay cuts or layoffs (Pagano and
Volpin 2001, 2005; Roe 2003). The strongest support for investor protections
comes from minority shareholders, who benefit from resulting increases in the
value of their holdings (Pagano and Volpin 2005; Perotti and von Thadden
2006). Roe (2003), and Gourevitch and Shinn (2005), in their characterizations
of the ‘‘corporatist coalition’’, argue that consensual politics is the key factor
allowing labor and insiders to form a successful political coalition against inves-
tor protection.7
In addition, some interest group theories incorporate the public interest in
promoting financial development (and therefore in growth and a consumer sur-
plus) through high levels of investor protection. Perotti and Volpin (2004, 2007)
and Bebchuk and Neeman (forthcoming) both show that public preferences that
are motivated by changes in welfare deriving from stock market performance can
influence policy decisions. These papers suggest that more publicly accountable
governments feel greater pressure to cater to the public interest, as opposed to
appeasing corporate insiders, and will therefore adopt more shareholder-friendly
corporate governance regimes.8 In a related work on the regulation of firm entry,
Scartascini (2002) argues that the relative vulnerability of governments elected
under majoritarian electoral laws leads these governments to provide the public
good of low barriers to entry.
6 The prominent exception is the law and finance theory offered by La Porta et al. (1998). However, this work
has been heavily criticized, (see Schmidbauer 2006 for an overview of the debate).
7 There is, however, a considerable amount of controversy over labor’s preferences as well the extent to which
they are involved in the modern policy-making process (for example, Cioffi and Hopner 2006; Culpepper forth-
coming-a,b). Many elements of investor protection, such as transparency in accounting or bans on insider trading,
do not meaningfully impact corporate control or employment security in the way that (for example) takeover rules
do. Thus, on some issues central to the protection of minority shareholders, there are fewer material incentives for
labor to mobilize in opposition to investor protections. Similarly, Gourevitch and Shinn (2005) argue that pension
holding by labor may align their interests with minority shareholders and in favor of increased investor protections.
8 These theories assume, as we do, that the balance of special interest lobbying will fall on the side of insider
interests, who typically face far smaller barriers to collective action than do shareholders. In the special case in
which special interests are aligned with the public interests, the policy choice becomes trivial.
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International Politics of Investor Protection
However, there are strong reasons to suspect that existing interest group theories
are incomplete. First, domestic political institutions—including electoral sys-
tems—are rarely altered and therefore cannot explain the considerable changes
in the protection of investors within states over time. Second, the interest group
literature has not yet offered an account of how international market forces bear
on the decisions to adopt investor-friendly policies. This is an important omis-
sion and it is the principal area in which we seek to contribute. Domestic politics
do not occur in a vacuum. Governments’ abilities to maintain competitive capital
markets are tied closely to other states’ policy decisions. It is therefore unsurpris-
ing that models of diffusion have recently become a mainstay of the interna-
tional political economy literature (Simmons and Elkins 2004 and Elkins et al.
2006).
Recently, international competition has also been recognized as a force for
policy homogenization in investor protection and corporate ownership struc-
tures. Hansmann and Kraakman (2001) and Rajan and Zingales (2003) both
note that exposure to the global economy can lead governments to adopt pro-
shareholder policies. Kamar (2006) notes that many recent pro-investor reforms
across Europe have been motivated by politicians’ desires to remain competitive
with neighboring markets in their drive to attract equity capital. Hebb and
Wo´jcik (2005) note that the reallocation of investment capital from states with
poor corporate governance standards to states with higher corporate governance
standards can motivate significant reforms in the developing world. In spite of
these examples, which provide a firm foundation for investigating the role of
competitive pressures, diffusion and its interaction with domestic political institu-
tions have remained largely absent in statistical work on investor protections.
Theory
To motivate our hypotheses and empirical tests we develop a simple model of
investor protection. We take as given the perception among policymakers that
protecting investors will help develop stock markets and thereby aid economic
growth.9 In our model, governments choose between providing a public good
(high levels of investor protection) and a private good (low level of investor
protection). Our model is similar in this regard to those presented by Grossman
and Helpman (2001), Rogowski and Kayser (2002) and Scartascini (2002). We
model the decision over investor protection as a game of complete information
involving two actors: an incumbent government and a lobby group representing
corporate insiders (Figure 2 shows the sequence of play).10 In our model, gov-
ernments are responsible for setting the level of investor protection, which we
denote as X 2 [0,1], with higher values indicating higher levels of protection.
Governments’ decision over X is influenced by the lobbying efforts of insiders
9 The prevalence of this perception is well captured by the Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes
(ROSC) a joint project between the IMF and World Bank, in cooperation with the OECD, IOSCO, and others that
rates corporate governance standards in emerging economies with the express purpose of encouraging cross-
national harmonization in regulatory practices including corporate governance standards. However, we should note
that this perception does not accurately describe conventional wisdom about all corporate governance issues at all
times. The Anglo-American model has not always dominated and some of its provisions—liberal takeover laws, for
example—remain controversial in many countries. Nonetheless, we think this assumption accurately captures the
debate over insider trading laws. While dissension exists in the literature (for example, Manne 1966) we are un-
aware of parallel dissensions in the public policy sphere. As noted above, this is surely informed by the fact that insi-
der trading laws (unlike takeover laws) do not disrupt ownership patterns or employment security.
10 Some readers may note that our model does not feature international organizations such as the World Bank,
IMF, OECD, and others that been active in the promotion of high corporate governance standards, including insi-
der trading laws. Much of this activity has been a response to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, and thus does not
bear strongly on our sample, which ends in 1999 due to data restrictions.
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and politicians’ desire to be reelected. The game begins with insider lobbyists
declaring a ‘‘contribution schedule’’—a complete menu noting the size of the
gift they are willing to give in exchange for any possible policy choice made by
the government, which in this case refers to any value of X. We denote this gift
as C(X). Following from similar models in the literature, corporate insiders adopt
a ‘‘truthful’’ contribution schedule in which policies closer to their ideal point
are rewarded with larger contributions.11
In the second move of the game, the government chooses a policy X and
then collects CI(X) from the insider lobbyists. The chosen policy then directly
affects subsequent market performance. Ceteris paribus, if investor rights are
protected markets perform well; if not, then markets perform poorly. This is
obviously an abstraction from the reality of very noisy markets that respond to
a variety of stimuli, but it is an abstraction that nonetheless well captures
recent empirical work in economics and the general consensus among policy-
makers. In the final move of the game, voters cast their ballots in accordance
with perceived changes in their individual welfares. Voters need not observe
the policy directly to punish incumbent for perceived welfare loses. Thus, gov-
ernments that do not protect investor rights are more likely to face public
sanction, regardless of the visibility of the policy to voters.12 The core tension
faced by politicians is therefore how to balance the interests of money-contrib-
uting insiders against their own electoral interest in the votes of the general
public.
Model
To structure the utility functions we assume that both actors have an ideal level
of investor protection—XP for government and XP for insiders—that is the prod-
uct of their own local knowledge of investor protection’s likely impact on overall
market growth and the size of insider’s rents, respectively. We assume that XP is
the policy that maximizes economic performance and, therefore, reelection.13
We assume that XI is less than or equal to XP, as insiders have no incentive to
lobby for a policy that is gives shareholders an inefficiently large amount of
power. The utility functions for politicians and insiders are stated as quadratic
loss functions and are given below.
Politician0s utility function ¼ GðX ;C IðX ÞÞ ¼ Wp 
ðX  X PÞ2
2
þ C IðX Þ ð1Þ
Insider0s utility function ¼ U ðX ;C IðX ÞÞ ¼ W I 
ðX  X IÞ2
2
 C IðX Þ ð2Þ
  T= 1  T = 2  T = 3  T = 4 
  Insiders Announce Government Chooses Economic Effects Election 
  Contribution  Policy and Collects Are Realized    
  Schedules  Contributions      
FIG 2. Sequence of Moves
11 See, for example, Bernheim and Whinston (1986), Grossman and Helpman (1994, 1996), and Dixit, Gross-
man, and Helpman (1997) for a fuller justification of our use of ‘‘truthful’’ contribution schedules.
12 Investment decisions can have politically sensitive implications aside from welfare gains. For example, foreign
ownership of strategically important industries such as ports can generate political controversy—for example, Dubai
Ports World’s attempted purchase of P&O. However, because these purchases involve a controlling share there is
no reason to expect that they would be more likely to occur in the presence of an insider trading law.
13 Note that XP is the government’s ideal policy in the absence of lobbying. The manner in which government
trades off between votes from the public and lobbying from insiders is captured in the equilibrium policy, _X .
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We define Wp as the relative weight governments place on economic out-
comes, which in our model equates to the effect those outcomes have on
reelection bids, vis-a`-vis political contributions. The weight governments give to
gifts from lobbyists is normalized to 1. In keeping with Bebchuk and Neeman
(forthcoming) and Perotti and Volpin (2004, 2007), we assume that gifts from
lobbyists have additional utility that is unconnected to an incumbent
government’s ability to hold office.14 WI is the weight that insiders assign to
policy vis-a`-vis gift giving. The weight that insiders assign to the costs of gift
giving is normalized to one.
The equilibrium solution to this game reduces to one of direct lobby control
wherein lobbies simply compensate politicians with money for the utility lost by
deviating from Xp. To be more specific, the lobbyist solves the following maximi-
zation problem:
maxðX ;CðX ÞÞ W I  ðX  X
IÞ2
2
 C IðX Þ ð3Þ
s.t.Wp  ðX  X
pÞ2
2
þ C IðX Þ ¼ W p  ðX
p  X pÞ2
2
¼ 0 ð4Þ
Equation (4) shows that the lobby sets their contribution so that the government
is left indifferent between adopting their ideal point and the equilibrium policy.
This implies that CI(X) is set as
W p  ðX  X
pÞ2
2
so that the lobbyist is maximizing:
maxðX Þ W I  ðX  X
IÞ2
2
W p  ðX




W IðX I  _X Þ þW pðX p  _X Þ ð6Þ
Where _X indicates the equilibrium level of X. From the first order conditions
the equilibrium policy choice is
_X ¼ ðX
IW I þW pX pÞ
W p þW I ð7Þ
As Dixit et al. (1997) note, Equation (7) is effectively a weighted average
of each actor’s policy preferences. The intuition behind Equation (7) is
straightforward: as Wp increases _X approaches X
p, and when WI increases,
_X approaches XI. Because Xp ‡ XI by definition, _X is therefore increases in Wp.
Because insider lobbyists will choose a contribution schedule that keeps politi-
cians indifferent between accepting insiders’ preferred policy and their own, we
can find the equilibrium contribution _C I( _X ) by plugging Equation (7) into
Equation (1) and setting this equation to 0. This yields,
14 This assumption has support in the empirical literature. Extant empirical literature consistently finds that
campaign spending by the incumbent lacks a meaningful impact on votes (for example, Glantz, Abramowitz and
Burkhart 1976; Jacobson 1978, 1980, 1985, 1990; Welch 1981; Abramowitz 1991; Levitt 1994; Gerber 2004; and see
Green and Krasno 1988 for an alternative finding). In practice, one could easily allow reelection odds to be increas-
ing in campaign contributions. As long as contributions have some positive utility outside of reelection, and as long
as incumbent governments’ reelection prospects are more closely tied to economic outcomes during their tenure
than to campaign spending, the results of this model would remain unchanged. However, the cost to parsimony for
allowing reelection odds to increase in campaign contributions is significant. Analysis of such dynamics, while inter-
esting in their own right, falls outside the purview of this paper.
663Andrew Kerner and Jeffrey Kucik
_CIð _X Þ ¼ W p  ð
ðX IW I þW pX pÞ
ðW pþW IÞ
2
 X pÞ2 ð8Þ
Hypotheses
While this model suggests a variety of hypotheses, we focus on one implica-
tion in particular: levels of investor protection increase in government
accountability—that is, when Wp assumes high values. We argue that Wp
derives from both domestic and international sources. On the domestic side,
accountability varies as a function of political institutions. Electoral rules dic-
tate how politicians make tradeoffs between competing interests. Rogowski
and Kayser (2002) argue that electoral rules determine the relative weights
that politicians place on votes (outsiders’ interests) and financial contributions
(insiders’ interests). They attribute these differences to seat-vote elasticity—the
effect of incremental changes in vote share on legislative seat shares. Seat-vote
elasticity is comparatively higher in majoritarian systems than in proportional
representation systems. This disparity in elasticity across institutional structures
has important implications for policy: it implies that reelection prospects
are tied more closely to votes than financial contributions under majoritarian
rules. Policy decisions reflect this imbalance. Rogowski and Kayser show
majoritarian systems produce outcomes that favor the interests of consumers
over those of producers. In our context, their theory predicts that major-
itarian states are more likely to adopt and enforce investor protections
than their proportional representation counterparts. This leads to our first
hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Governments are more likely to adopt and enforce insider trading laws
under majoritarian electoral rules.
Domestic institutions do not tell the whole story. Rogowski and Kayser’s
(2002) logic only applies if investor protections have an effect on votes. If
investor protections do not affect the welfare of voters then they have no
incentives to sanction governments by voting them out of office, and govern-
ments therefore risk nothing by favoring insiders’ interests by permitting
rent-seeking. The question therefore remains: Under what conditions do inves-
tor protections affect the welfare of the voting public? To answer this ques-
tion we look to the important role played by international competitive
pressures.
We argue that competition over internationally mobile portfolio capital creates
material incentives for states to adopt and enforce investor protections. States
can pay a high cost for allowing rent-seeking. Failing to protect investor rights
reduces the accumulation of internationally mobile capital. Studies have shown
that international investors’ portfolios tilt toward markets with high levels of
investor protections (for example, Aggarwal, Klapper, and Wysocki 2005) and
that portfolio investors will occasionally pull their money out of a market that
permits rent-seeking (Hebb and Wo´jcik 2005). Capital flight has a number of
adverse effects on welfare. An efficient and well-capitalized financial system helps
channel savings into productive use by domestic industry (King and Levine
1993). Conversely, shortages of capital reduce the domestic tax base, generate
incentives for governments to accumulate external debt and place downward
pressure on personal income levels (Alesina and Tabellini 1988; Lensink, Her-
mes, and Murinde 2000; Collier et al. 2001). In aggregate, these adverse effects
can create widespread dissatisfaction with the economic performance of incum-
bent governments. The willingness of investors to abandon markets, along with
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these concomitant welfare losses, places pressure on politicians to compete for
internationally mobile capital.
These pressures are not evenly distributed across space or time. One of the
principal sources of competition for capital is between states at similar levels of
development.15 Internationally mobile investors typically distribute their capital
across developed and emerging markets to increase returns and lower risk by
choosing investments whose returns are relatively uncorrelated (for example,
Errunza and Pabmanabhan 1988; Harvey 1993). At all levels of development,
however, unchecked rent-seeking lower returns and deters investment. By failing
to protect investor rights, states lose out on investment capital, particularly to
markets at similar levels of development that often offer investors a similar
risk-return profile and a similar opportunity to diversify away portfolio risk.
Therefore, we expect that governments feel the most pressure to protect inves-
tors when countries at a similar development level protect investors from rent
seeking. This leads us to our second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 2: Governments are more likely to adopt and enforce insider trading laws
when countries of a similar development level have already done so.
We further believe that these domestic and international factors will condition
one another. For any given electoral rule, we expect that increased competition
in capital markets will increase the level of observed investor protection. Like-
wise, for any given level of competitive pressure we expect that more majoritar-
ian electoral rules will increase the level of investor protection. If our tests were
aimed at a continuous measure of investor protection, we would not expect an
interaction between international competition and domestic politics. However,
we are interested in the adoption and initial enforcement of insider trading laws,
both of which we operationalize with dichotomous variables in our empirical
tests (see below). Thus, what we observe is whether or not Wp gets above a dis-
crete threshold, regardless of whether Wp is primarily a function of international
or domestic pressures. To put this more concretely, we expect that the impact of
electoral law will diminish when international competition is fierce, because gov-
ernments running for reelection under all sorts of electoral rules will feel suffi-
cient pressure to adopt and enforce insider trading laws. Likewise, we expect
that the influence of international competition will diminish when governments
are seeking office under relatively majoritarian electoral laws, where relatively
slight competition will be enough to move government to ban insider trading.
This motivates a third set of hypotheses.
Hypothesis 3a: The impact of electoral law on the adoption and enforcement of insider
trading laws will diminish as competitive pressures increase.
Hypothesis 3b: The impact of competitive pressures on the adoption and enforcement of
insider trading laws will diminish in countries with relatively majoritarian electoral laws.
15 This is a similar logic to that used to describe a competitive diffusion variable used in Simmons and Elkins
(2004). Of course, similarities in development level is not the only way to conceptualize the extent to which coun-
tries compete for capital, though we do think it is the most important one. Cultural and linguistic similarities, for
example, surely shape the pattern of investment flows. In our empirical analysis we control for geographic proxim-
ity as a way of controlling for some of these alternative mechanisms. Ideally, we would prefer to construct a measure
based on the actual flows of portfolio investment to assess the extent to which countries compete for capital. Such
data is unavailable for most countries in most years of our sample, however. While there is more data available for
FDI flows, this data also lacks sufficient coverage to construct a meaningful variable for most countries in most years
of our sample.
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Insider Trading Laws
Insider trading occurs when an actor with access to non-public information uses
that information to trade corporate securities. Non-public information is typically
ascertained via a trader’s position inside of a firm—as a controlling shareholder
(often including foreign direct investors), director, manager, or other privileged
employee—where they may have special knowledge of unannounced takeover
bids, upcoming earnings reports, or any other information that may impact the
value of shares. There are several reasons, both substantive and methodological,
why insider trading makes a useful policy domain.
First, insider trading highlights the distributional conflict at the heart of the
political competition over investor protection. By definition, not every trader has
equal access to non-public information; only certain actors enjoy a unique advan-
tage. When insider trading is banned, information traders—traders who invest in
knowledge of publicly available information—can profit from the informational
advantage gleaned from their research. When insider trading is allowed, how-
ever, insiders will routinely beat information traders in the market, thereby
undermining those traders’ material incentives to participate in securities trading
(Goshen and Parchomovsky 2001; summarized in Beny 2005, 2007). In this way,
insider trading pits the interests of outside investors against those of corporate
insiders.16
The distributional consequences of insider trading are not confined to informa-
tion traders. By reducing the expected returns for outside holders of securities
and thereby lowering the demand for corporate securities by outside investors,
allowing unfettered insider trading increases firms’ cost of capital (for example,
Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002; Beny 2005).17 This has welfare implications for
existing outside shareholders whose portfolio values fall, entrepreneurs who are
less able to raise new funds on capital markets, and the non-shareholding public
who has an implicit interest in a healthy capital market and its ability to finance
the ‘‘real’’ economy. Insider trading laws are therefore similar to a larger set of
investor protections that promote financial development at the expense of insi-
der’s rent seeking opportunities.
A second reason to study insider trading laws is that these laws have become
an increasingly common feature of national—and in the case of the European
Union, transnational—regulatory landscapes. The first recognizable insider trad-
ing law was enacted as part of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 in the
United States, which banned a variety of profit making trades by corporate insid-
ers. Other countries were initially slow to adopt insider trading prohibitions. Very
few countries—the United States, Canada, and France—adopted insider trading
laws prior to the fall of Bretton Woods and the subsequent dismantling of capital
controls in the early 1970s. By 1980, six more countries had adopted an insider
trading law. It was not until the 1990s, however, that the policy truly expanded;
57 countries adopted an insider trading law during the 1990s. The diffusion of
enforcement follows a similar pattern, though there are far fewer enforcers than
adopters.
A third reason to explore the diffusion of insider trading laws is that, unlike
dependent variables used in previous studies of investor protection, the relatively
recent spread of insider trading prohibitions allows us to observe the exact politi-
cal and economic conditions under which these laws were first adopted and
16 Empirically, Bushman et al. (2005) demonstrate that analyst following—a proxy for the degree of investor
interest in a firm—increases after the enforcement of an insider trading ban, particularly in emerging markets. Sim-
ilarly, Bris (2005), Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) and Beny (2005, 2007) all find that insider trading laws increase
stock market liquidity.
17 Beny also finds that more stringent insider trading laws correlate with more accurate stock prices.
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enforced. This stands in stark contrast to the more commonly used La Porta
et al. (1998) data set, which captures a cross-sectional snapshot of corporate gov-
ernance policy in 1997, but cannot tell us what political-economic conditions
were in place when these policies were first adopted. This can be problematic
for theories that focus on political institutions or economic factors because the
conditions at the date of observation may not be the same as those in place
when the policies were set. Bebchuk and Roe (1999) have noted strong theoreti-
cal reasons for the considerable path dependence observed in the data, which
further obscures the link between a cross-sectional snapshot of policy and the
political economic factors that give way to its rise.18 Focusing on insider trading
laws thus gives us unique insight into the political determinants of investor pro-
tection. Only the United States’ banning of insider trading in 1934 predates our
sample. This allows us to effectively avoid the problem of unaccounted for path
dependence.
In sum, insider trading provides us with an empirical domain (i) that high-
lights the political competition over investor protection; (ii) that has become an
increasingly prominent feature of national regulatory schemes; and (iii) that pro-
vides unique insight into the precise political-economic conditions that promote
investor protections.
Research Design Sample
To test the validity of our hypotheses, we construct a country-year data set from
the years 1951 to 1999 for the 84 democracies with functioning stock markets,
though missing data on the independent variable reduces our sample to 57
countries.19 We limit ourselves to democracies because electoral proportionality
has little meaning in a nondemocratic state. We define democracy very leniently,
allowing any country with a polity score over 0 (polity scores range from )10 to
10) into our sample.20 Our sample is limited to the years 1951–1999 because
data on the dependent variables are only available through 1999 and data on
some of our independent variables begin in 1950, which, because of lagged vari-
ables, effectively begins our sample in 1951. Not every country is represented in
every year because (i) democracy scores fluctuate over time; and (ii) not every
country has an operating stock exchange for the entire period.
European Community Insider Trading Directive (ECITD) of 1989 prohibits
insider trading in all EU member states. Under ECITD, national lawmakers in
the European Union were expected to adopt insider trading prohibitions by
1992, though in practice several of these countries already had laws in place and
others did not adopt insider trading laws until several years later. Enforcements
are unaffected by the ECITD. To accommodate this, we include a Europe
dummy variable to allow for a separate European intercept.21
18 Other data sets including Pagano and Volpin (2005), which extends La Porta, et al.’s measure to the years
1993–2002, and Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007), which measures creditor protections from 1978 to 2002,
attenuate this problem, but even in these data sets much of the information contained in the variable relates to pol-
icies enacted before the observation period begins.
19 Our sample for insider trading law adoption and enforcement use a different set of 57 countries. It is merely
be coincidence that the six countries that, for various reasons, are included in our model of insider trading law
enforcement but not adoption (Armenia, Moldova, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Sweden, United States) are
matched exactly by six countries that feature in our model of insider trading law adoption by not enforcement
(Bolivia, El Salvador, Malawi, Namibia, Peru, Ukraine).
20 Using higher thresholds does not change our core results.
21 The separate Europe intercept turns out to be inconsequential to our estimates. In unreported robustness
checks we found very similar results using a Europe-only sample as well as a non-European sample. These regres-
sions are available from the authors on request.
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Dependent Variables
We use two dependent variables, one that notes the year of insider trading
law adoption (Adoption) and one that notes the initial enforcement (Enforce-
ment). Both measures are dichotomously coded such that ‘‘1’’ denotes either
the adoption or enforcement of a law and ‘‘0’’ denotes that such an event
has not yet taken place. These data were taken from Bhattacharya and Daouk
(2002).
Independent Variables
Our theory predicts that more proportional systems are less likely to adopt
and enforce insider trading laws. We operationalize proportionality using a
measure of median district magnitude taken from Golder (2005). Golder’s
data shows the median number of elected representatives from each district.
The measure ranges from 1 in the case of majoritarian systems such as the
United States to a maximum of 150 for the Netherlands. We subtract 1 from
Median District Magnitude (making the minimum observed value equal to 0,
rather than 1) to make the coefficients reported in the regression tables more
meaningful in light of our use of interaction terms.22 Using this measure has
an advantage over the dichotomous proportional ⁄majoritarian indicator vari-
able used in Rogowski and Kayser’s (2002) study of price levels and the tri-
chotomous measure used in Pagano and Volpin’s (2005) study of shareholder
voting rights. In particular, Median District Magnitude allows us to capture the
considerable variation that exists among proportional systems. For example, at
various points throughout the sample, Chile, Panama, and Thailand have a
median district magnitude of 2 while the Netherlands, which pools candidates
in a single, national district, has a district magnitude of 150.23 This is a mean-
ingful difference that would be lost using a dichotomous or trichotomous
measure. In order to capture the extent of competition between countries at
similar development levels, we construct a variable that notes the percentage
of countries at similar development levels that have banned insider trading in
year t. We define similar development level by calculating the difference in
the log of GDP per capita (in $millions) for every dyad of countries with a
stock exchange, and include those countries with GDPs per capita that are
similar enough that the absolute value of the difference in logged GDP per
capita is less than .3.24 For the most part, this produces intuitive pairings. Cal-
culating Poland’s value in 1999 uses information from 21 countries, including
Brazil, South Africa, Slovakia, Russia, Lebanon, Mexico, and Thailand. Com-
puting a score for the United States in 1999 includes data from Australia,
Austria, Canada, Denmark, Iceland, Kuwait, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nor-
way, Singapore, and Switzerland. This variable also reflects development over
time. Computing a value for Ireland in 1979 uses information from Portugal,
Venezuela, Argentina, Spain, Singapore, and Greece. Ireland’s 1999 score uses
information from 28 countries including Austria, Canada, France, and the
Netherlands. Despite the occasionally odd pairing (Kuwait, for example, does
not have a stock market that is similar to the American stock market in any
meaningful sense, despite the similarities in GDP per capita), we believe this
22 This transformation is made solely to make the regression tables slightly more meaningful and makes no
change to our findings, which, in any event, are better established by graphs of conditional coefficients.
23 Prior to 1956 Golder reports a district magnitude of 100 for the Netherlands.
24 The benefit of this construction is that it does not necessarily increase simply because a country has many
peers in its development level group. Using a cutoff of .3 is arbitrary, and was selected because it created reasonable
pairings for most country-years we examined. In practice, using different cutoffs produces similar results.
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technique has produced valid measures of the extent to which a country faces
competitive pressures from policies in its development level cohort.
Control Variables
It is possible that the adoption and enforcement of insider trading is affected by
a number of factors whose exclusion may introduce omitted variable bias into
our estimates. We include several measures to control for these alternative expla-
nations.
We include a variable labeled Proximity Diffusion along with its interaction with
Median District Magnitude. Proximity Diffusion is constructed as a count of countries
that have adopted a ban on insider trading, weighted by the inverse of the log of
the distance between countries’ capital cities.25 Thus, this variable takes on larger
values when extant insider trading laws are clustered in proximate countries and
smaller values when these laws are clustered in more distant countries. We
include this variable because it is likely that there are other paths of competitive
pressures beyond those captured in Development Level Diffusion, and equally likely
that there are alternative vectors of diffusion beyond competitive pressures (see
Simmons and Elkins 2004). In unreported robustness checks we modeled several
of these alternatives individually and found that in each case (i) none of the
alternative explanations produced results that confounded the relationship we
find with Development Level Diffusion, and (ii) Development Level Diffusion appeared
to be the dominant vector of diffusion in terms of statistical and substantive
significance.
To control for La Porta, et al.’s legal heritage theory, we include a dichot-
omously coded variable that is coded ‘‘1’’ for countries whose legal systems
are based on common law and ‘‘0’’ otherwise (Common Law). Controlling for
legal heritage is important because countries with majoritarian electoral laws
also tend to have legal systems based on common law, which La Porta et al.
argue increases the likelihood that states protect the rights of investors. Simi-
larly, countries with higher district magnitudes are also more likely to have a
larger number of veto players in government, which are known to stifle pol-
icy changes, presumably including the adoption of insider trading laws. We
control for the number of Veto Players using Polcon_iii from Henisz’s Database
of Political Constraints.26 As mentioned above, we include a dichotomous indi-
cator coded ‘‘1’’ for European countries and ‘‘0’’ otherwise, allowing for a
separate intercept for countries that were or may have been impacted by
ECDIT. We also control for several variables that have been shown in related
literature to influence levels of investor protection. These controls are: democ-
racy, which is measured using the Polity IV data set, log of GDP, which is
introduced at a 1-year lag and is taken from the Penn World Tables data
set and the log of GDP per capita, which is also introduced at a 1-year lag
and is taken from the Penn World Tables data set.27
We also allow for a separate intercept for Israel by including a dichotomous
indicator variable coded 1 for Israel and 0 otherwise. Our model does a poor job
of explaining Israel, whose large district magnitude (2nd highest in our sample)
and early adoption and enforcement of insider trading (12th earliest adopter
25 In unreported robustness checks, using measures of contiguity as a substitute for the distance between capi-
tals yields comparable results.
26 Henisz 2008. We use Polcon_iii instead of Polcon_iv because the latter includes measures of subnational units
of government and judicial independence, neither of which reflect our theoretical reasons for including veto play-
ers in our analysis. We prefer the polcon variable to the checks variable taken from Beck et al. (2001) because the
latter only extends back to 1975, well after countries began adopting and enforcing insider trading laws.
27 Introducing or omitting these variables is inconsequential to our results. Models excluding these variables
are available from the authors on request.
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and 7th earliest enforcer) make it an outlier in our dataset and gives it signifi-
cant leverage over our results. To be clear, including Israel in our sample with-
out the separate intercept produces a model with significantly less robust
results.28
Our baseline model specification reads as follows:
Adoption/Enforcement ¼ b0 þ b1 Median District Magnitudeit
þ b2  Development Level Diffusionit1
þ b3  (Median District Magnitudeit
 Development Level Diffusionit1Þ
þ b4  Proximity Diffusionit1
þ b5  (Median District Magnitudeit
 Proximity Diffusionit1Þ
þ b6  Democracyit þ b7  Veto Playersit
þ b8  Log GDPit1 þ b9  Log GDP per capitait1
þ b10  Common Lawi þ b11  Israeli
þ b12  Europei þ eit
Analyses and Results
Given the nature of our data and hypotheses, the appropriate estimation tech-
nique is event history analysis using a single failure-event per cross-section data
structure. We report results using the commonly used Cox proportional hazards
estimator, with data disaggregated (‘‘grouped’’) by the country-year.29 The advan-
tages and disadvantages posed by the Cox estimator are well known in the political
science (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004;
Box-Steffensmeier and Zorn 2002).30 To demonstrate that our results are not an
artifact of our choice of estimators, we supplement our main models with robust-
ness checks using a binary time series cross-sectional model with a clog-log link
function, as well as fully parametric models specified with Weibull and log-normal
distributions. The results are effectively the same across all specifications.
A requirement of event history models is the specification of an underlying
time counter. This is straightforward in our models of insider trading law
enforcement: the counter starts in the year of insider trading law adoption. Start-
ing at the date of adoption also has the advantage of ensuring that our findings
28 Similar results are obtained if we exclude Israel from the sample. To be clear, however, including Israel in
our sample but not allowing a separate intercept produces a model with less robust results. We don’t control for
government partisanship in the reported models. We do this for two reasons. First, the best available measure, the
trichotomous measure of government partisanship from the database of political institutions, has obvious and well-
appreciated limitations. Second, this variable is only coded for years beginning in 1975, considerably after the
beginning of our period of observation. Thus including this variable requires us to eliminate several early law adop-
tions and enforcements. This non-random elimination of observations introduces bias that is not justified, given the
explanatory limitations of the variable itself. In unreported robustness checks we find similar, though not identical,
results from models using the variable.
29 Organizing the data by country-year is not the only way of organizing the data. We could also consider each
spell of democratic government as its own cross section. In this way, Pakistan, for example, would enter the regres-
sion analysis separately four times, once for every time its polity score crossed zero during the sample. Reorganizing
the data in this way does not alter our findings.
30 We report regressions using the Breslow method of dealing with ties. Our results are robust to estimations
using either the Efron or Breslow method. A further complication posed by the use of a Cox model is the propor-
tional hazards assumption. As noted by several authors, violations of this assumption can lead to biased results
(Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003). Diagnostic tests examining the scaled Schoenfeld residuals fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the proportionality assumption is satisfied.
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in our enforcement models capture an entirely different set of data than our
adoption model. Because one sample begins at the moment the other ends,
there can be no overlap. The coding is less clear for our models of insider trad-
ing law adoption. While many countries began stock exchange operations during
nineteenth and twentieth century, other states had active stock markets for cen-
turies before they adopted an insider trading law. Substantively, it is not clear
whether the existence of a pre-modern stock market should matter for our analy-
ses. Our solution is to begin the counter at the start of the postwar era or in the
first year of stock market operations if trading began more recently than 1946.
The interpretation of Cox model coefficients is slightly different from other
commonly used estimators. The directionality of the coefficients is similar to
OLS coefficients: positive coefficients suggest that an increase in a variable
increases the probability of failure (in the case, failure means the adoption or
initial enforcement of insider trading laws); negative coefficients indicate the
opposite. More precisely, significant variables impact the duration time by
increasing or decreasing the hazard, which captures the likelihood of experienc-
ing a failure event, which in this case is the adoption or initial enforcement of
an insider trading law. To find the change in the hazard affected by an X unit
change from a baseline value of d we employ the standard transformation,31
%increase in hðtÞ ¼ 100  ½expðb  ðdþ X ÞÞ  expðb  dÞ=expðb  dÞ
We include plots of the substantive effects of a shift in our independent vari-
ables along with our coefficient estimates.
Model 1: Adoption of Insider Trading Laws
Our first analysis examines the adoption of insider trading laws, (the results are
shown in Model 1 in Table 1). The estimates, and the associated conditional
coefficients described below, lend support to all three of our hypotheses. The
regression coefficient on Median District Magnitude is statistically significant
(though only at the .1 level) and negative, indicating that when Development Level






Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Median District Magnitude )0.039 0.022* )0.230 0.101**
Development Level Diffusion (lag) )0.572 1.002 3.455 1.960*
Dev. Level Diff. (lag) · Med. Dist. Mag. 0.087 0.040** 0.219 0.114*
Proximity Diffusion (lag) 0.377 0.134*** )0.202 0.166
Prox. Diff. (lag) · Med. Dist. Mag. )0.004 0.003 0.001 0.007
Democracy )0.052 0.173 )0.246 0.161
Veto Players )1.208 1.326 2.871 1.859
Log GDP (lag) )0.083 0.103 0.662 0.166***
Log GDP Per Capita (lag) 0.510 0.295* )0.076 0.346
Common Law 0.488 0.412 )0.082 0.569
Israel 3.573 1.900* 14.180 5.253***
Europe 0.092 0.414 0.928 0.540*
N 838 368
Failures 46 28
Log pseudolikelihood )103.59938 )64.657649
(Notes. *p < .100, **p < .050, ***p < .001.)
31 See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004:60).
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Diffusion is equal to zero the proportionality of electoral rules has a significant
and negative impact on the likelihood of adopting an insider trading law. The
regression coefficient on Development Level Diffusion is negative and statistically
insignificant, indicating that Development Level Diffusion is not a significant factor
in countries that use winner-takes-all electoral laws—that is, when Median District
Magnitude is equal to zero. However, the positive and significant coefficient on
the interaction of Development Level Diffusion and Median District Magnitude sug-
gests that (i) competitive pressures have a larger, positive impact in countries
with more proportional electoral rules; and (ii) that electoral rules have a smal-
ler impact as competitive pressures increase.
Because our results indicate a statistically significant interaction between Med-
ian District Magnitude and Development Levels Diffusion, conditional coefficients can
give us a better sense of our findings (see Figures 3 and 4). We graph the condi-
tional coefficients for a variable evaluated at a range of the conditioning variable
that corresponds to the 10th through the 90th percentile of that variable in the
sample used in that model. We graph three lines in each figure: a point estimate
and the upper and lower bounds of a 90% confidence interval.32 When all three
lines are on the same side of zero, the point estimate is statistically significant at
the .1 level. When the upper and lower bounds are on different sides of zero the
point estimate is insignificant at the .1 level.
Figure 3 shows the conditional coefficients for Median District Magnitude at a
range of values of Development Level Diffusion. Notice that the conditional coeffi-
cient for Median District Magnitude is statistically significant and negative (both
upper and lower bounds are below zero) at low values of Development Level Diffu-
sion. However, Median District Magnitude becomes statistically insignificant as
Development Level Diffusion increases even slightly above 0. This indicates that
countries with proportional electoral rules are less likely to ban insider trading
FIG 3. Conditional Coefficient for Median District Magnitude
FIG 4. Conditional Substantive Effects of a change in Median District Magnitude from the 25th-75th
percentile
32 These values were generated using the lincom command in Stata 9.2.
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but that this effect fades quickly as competitive pressures increase, which is line
with Hypotheses 1 and 3a.
To show the substantive effects of Median District Magnitude on the adoption of
insider trading laws, Figure 4 converts the coefficients from Figure 3 into
substantive effects using the formula noted above. In the graph, we show the
conditional substantive impact of a shift in district magnitude from 0 to 9, which
corresponds to a move from the 25th to the 75th percentile of Median District
Magnitude in the sample. As can be seen, at very low levels of Development Level
Diffusion, a shift in Median District Magnitude from 9 to 0 has the substantive
impact of increasing the likelihood of an insider trading law being adopted by
2%.
Figure 5 shows the conditional coefficients for Development Level Diffusion at a
range of values for Median District Magnitude. The conditional coefficients for
Development Level Diffusion are insignificant at low and moderate levels of Median
District Magnitude but become statistically significant and positive at values of Med-
ian District Magnitude at or above 43, which is roughly the 88th percentile of the
observed data in this sample. This pattern supports Hypotheses 2 and 3b, sug-
gesting that countries facing competitive pressures will be more likely to adopt
insider trading laws, particularly in countries with highly proportional electoral
laws.
Figure 6 shows the conditional substantive effects for Development Level Diffu-
sion. We show the conditional substantive effect of a shift from the 25th to 75th
percentile of values in 1999, which corresponds to a shift from .07 to .35. The
statistically significant range of point predictions for Development Level Diffusion
vary from a 174% increase in the baseline hazard when Median District Magnitude
is equal to 48 up to a 783% increase in the baseline hazard when Median District
Magnitude is equal to 95. The confidence interval is extremely large, particularly
at higher values of Median District Magnitude. At values of Median District Magni-
tude of 9, the 90% confidence interval runs from 47.2% to 5,195%. Thus, while
our results allow us to say something about the directionality and statistical sig-
nificance of Development Level Diffusion, there is relatively little we can say about
the magnitude of its substantive effect, particularly in countries with highly pro-
portional electoral systems where competition’s impact is the largest.
FIG 5. Conditional Coefficient for Development Level Diffusion
FIG 6. Conditional Substantive Effects of a change in Development Level Diffusion from the
25th-75th percentile
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Model 2: Enforcement of Insider Trading Laws
Model 2 replicates Models 1 using the initial enforcement of an insider trading
law as the failure event (see Table 1). To reiterate from above, the sample in
these models begins at the year of insider trading law adoption and ends in the
year that law is first enforced. The results here are similar to those in reported
for Model 1. Median District Magnitude is again negatively signed and statistically
significant, indicating that more proportional electoral laws imply longer times
until an insider trading law is enforced, at least in the absence of any competitive
pressures. The interaction between Median District Magnitude and Development
Level Diffusion is positively signed and statistically significant. In other words, as
the proportionality of the electoral rule increases, the impact of competitive dif-
fusion decreases, and vice versa. Likewise, the effect of electoral rules on enforce-
ment is attenuated by competitive pressures. The coefficient for Development Level
Diffusion is positively signed and statistically significant. These regression coeffi-
cients are consistent with our findings in Model 1. To ascertain the full impact
of Median District Magnitude and Development Level Diffusion we again refer to con-
ditional coefficients and conditional substantive effects, which are plotted in
Figures 7–10.
Figure 7 shows the conditional coefficients for Median District Magnitude using
regression estimates from Model 2. As with Model 1, the conditional coefficients
for Median District Magnitude begin negative and statistically significant and move
toward zero as Development Level Diffusion increases, eventually reaching statistical
insignificance. Unlike in Model 1, however, the conditional coefficients here
remain statistically significant until roughly 68% of a country’s development
cohort has adopted a ban on insider trading. These results support Hypothesis
1, that countries with more proportional electoral laws are less likely to enforce
insider trading laws, and Hypothesis 3a, that the impact of Median District Magni-
tude is declining in the level of competitive diffusion.
Figure 8 shows the substantive effects of a move from a Median District Magni-
tude of 9 to a Median District Magnitude of 0 at a range of values for Development
FIG 7. Conditional Coefficients for Median District Magnitude
FIG 8. Conditional Substantive Effects of a change in Development Level Diffusion from the
25th-75th percentile
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Level Diffusion. In the absence of competitive pressures (the 1st percentile of
Development Level Diffusion is .16) a shift in Median District Magnitude from 9 to 0
has the effect of raising the baseline hazard by 82%. As Development Level Diffusion
increases this impact lowers, eventually reaching 56% at values of Development
Level Diffusion of .63, before slipping into statistical insignificance. As with the
conditional substantive effects plotted in Figure 6, the 90% confidence interval is
quite large.
Figure 9 shows the conditional coefficients for Development Level Diffusion. Like
the regression estimates reported in Table 1, the conditional coefficients plotted
in Figure 9 indicate that Development Level Diffusion is statistically significant and
positive over the entire plotted range. Moreover, the coefficient rises substan-
tially. Over the 10–90th percentile range of Median District Magnitude, the coeffi-
cient for Development Level Diffusion rises from 3.45 to 6.96. As before, these
finding suggests support for Hypotheses 1 and 3b.
Figure 10 shows the conditional substantive effects of a shift in Development
Level Diffusion from the 25th percentile in the sample (.382) to the 25th
percentile (.833) evaluated at the 10–90th percentile range of Median District
Magnitude. The substantive impact of Development Level Diffusion is statistically sig-
nificant and positive over the entire range, and rapidly increasing in Median Dis-
trict Magnitude. Over the full range the point estimate ranges from 374% (Median
District Magnitude of 0) to 2,202% (Median District Magnitude of 16). As before,
however, the 90% confidence interval is exceedingly large. At its largest span
(Median District Magnitude = 16) it ranges from 409% to 10,322%.
In sum, we find support for all of our hypotheses in both our models of insi-
der trading law adoption and insider trading law enforcement. In both cases,
increases in Median District Magnitude prolong the failure time, especially when
competitive diffusion is weak. Increases in Development Level Diffusion shorten the
failure time, particularly in countries with proportional electoral rules. While it
does appear that both variables have a greater impact on the enforcement,
rather than the adoption, of insider laws, the extremely wide confidence intervals
precludes our ability to say so definitively.
FIG 9. Conditional Coefficient for Development Level Diffusion
FIG 10. Conditional Substantive Effects of a change in Development Level Diffusion from the
25th-75th percentile
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Models 3–8: Robustness Checks
We subject our data to several alternative estimations to determine the robust-
ness of our results. The results of these robustness checks are reported in
Table 2.33 Models 3 and 4 estimate models of insider trading law adoption and
enforcement, respectively, using binary time series cross-sectional (BTSCS) meth-
ods that are outlined in Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) and are commonly used
to estimate models with grouped data such ours. We estimate our BTSCS using a
clog-log link as suggested by Beck, Katz, and Tucker, though the results are sub-
stantively almost identical using a logit model. We include year dummies
(excluded from the regression table) that are aggregated into 5-year spans in
our regression.34 The results from these models lead to very similar results as the
conclusion drawn from Models 1 and 2.
Models 5 and 6 reestimate Models 1 and 2, respectively, using a parametric
estimator that stipulates a Weibull distribution to model the baseline hazard.
The Weibull model, which is the most commonly used parametric estimator in
the political science literature, assumes a monotonically increasing or decreasing
baseline hazard. The results from Models 5 and 6 are substantially similar to
models listed in the four previous models.
Finally, Models 7 and 8 reestimate Models 1 and 2, respectively, using a para-
metric model that specifies a log-normal distribution for the baseline hazard.
The log-normal model, similarly to the log-logistic model, allows the baseline
hazard to be non-monotonic, unlike the Weibull. Comparing Akaike Information
Criterions, we found the log-normal model was a better fit to the data than the
log-logistic. The results are consistent with those found earlier, though the coeffi-
cients are reported in accelerated failure time, which reverses the sign and
changes the substantive interpretations.
Before concluding, we note that our control variables indicate some interest-
ing findings. Most prominently, we find no effect for legal heritage in any
model. While we hesitate to over-interpret non-findings, we do note that the
insignificance of legal heritage in accounting for corporate governance policies
once electoral rules are controlled for is consistent with Pagano and Volpin
(2005). Intuitively, we find that GDP has an impact on enforcement, but not
adoption, suggesting that the financial resources needed to detect and prosecute
a case of insider trading is a barrier to enforcement in countries with smaller
economies. Surprisingly, contra Beny (2008), we find no consistent effect for
democracy, though this is likely explained by the fact that our sample excludes
country-years with polity scores below 0.
Conclusions and Implications
This paper asks why, in spite of all the welfare benefits that accrue from protecting
investor rights, there is so much cross-national variation in the adoption and
enforcement of policies like insider trading laws. To answer this question we have
brought together two recent strands of comparative and international political
economy work. We argue that both domestic political institutions and interna-
tional competitive pressures bear on investor-related policy decisions. Only when
the influences of both are considered simultaneously does a fuller picture emerge.
33 We do not provide conditional coefficients or conditional substantive effects for these models, but such
graphs are available from the authors on request.
34 We aggregate the year dummies into 5-year chunks because the model would otherwise drop observations in
years of the time counter in which no countries adopted or initially enforced their insider trading laws. Five-year
spans were the smallest increment that allowed us to retain the same sample used in Models 1 and 2. Similar find-
ings were obtained in unreported robustness checks that modeled duration dependence using splines or time
trends.
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We have reported evidence in support of all three of our hypotheses. We
found that (i) electoral rules do have a significant effect at both the adoption
and enforcement stage, (ii) the policy choices made by countries at a similar
development level, with which countries compete for investment capital, are a
source of competitive pressure to adopt and enforce insider trading laws, and
(iii) international competition conditions the impact of domestic institutions,
and vice-versa. This finding is robust to the inclusion of variables meant to cap-
ture other sources of rising competitive pressures and to unreported robustness
checks in which plausible alternative mechanisms of competitive diffusion are
controlled for.
Our results provide strong evidence for a spatial diffusion process. For the rea-
sons presented in this paper we believe there are good reasons to believe this dif-
fusion is driven by international competition over capital. However, diffusion can
occur via a number of channels and it is difficult to devise tests that clearly dif-
ferentiate between these various channels. One alternative to our theory is that
the adoption of insider trading laws is driven by norms—ideas that spread
throughout the international community eventually reaching a ‘‘tipping point’’
after which they enjoy widespread acceptance (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998).
We grant that it is possible that a similar process explains the spread of insider
trading laws, and our statistical results can certainly be interpreted as evidence
for such a process. However, while the spread of insider trading laws match a
pattern consistent with the cascading of norms, it is not clear why it took so long
for the norm to spread. The first instance of adoption was in the 1930s (the Uni-
ted States in 1934) and it was not until the more than 40 years later that adop-
tions began to spread more rapidly. It is not a coincidence, we believe, that the
spread of insider trading laws only came after the relaxation of capital controls
and heightened competition between states for mobile portfolio capital, begin-
ning in the early 1970s and accelerating through the 1980s and 1990s. The tim-
ing of the diffusion suggests to us prima facie evidence that increased
competition over mobile capital was indeed the principal driving force behind
the spread of prohibitions on insider trading.
This paper makes several contributions. First, we offer a framework for under-
standing the political determinants of investor protection that is simple, draws on
works that are familiar to many political economists, addresses some of the short-
comings that we perceive in the literature, and which is supported by the data on
insider trading regulations. Two elements of our theory are particularly impor-
tant. First, by showing that the political pressures facing governments over inves-
tor protection policies such as insider trading laws are at least partly a function
of policy decisions made in other countries, we have attempted to integrate the
literature on investor protection with the considerable body of work on policy
diffusion. Several authors have noted that there is an international competitive
dynamic to investor protection, but such intuition is entirely absent in extant
statistical models. We have offered a theory that shows how institutions and
competitive pressures interact to define the incentives to enact investor protec-
tions. To that end, we see this paper not only as a complement to other works
on investor protection, but also to works that have noted the interaction between
domestic political institutions and policy diffusion.
Second, through our application of Rogowski and Kayser’s work on electoral
rules’ impact on political accountability, we can account for the notable dispari-
ties in investor protection across democracies. Given the centrality of such varia-
tion to the larger enterprise of the investor protection literature, this is no small
feature. While our causal mechanism linking electoral law to policy outcomes, as
well as the policy outcome considered, is quite different, we do note that our
findings are consistent with those made by Pagano and Volpin (2005) as well
as Gourevitch and Shinn (2005). Moreover, if, as it appears, countries with
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proportional electoral laws systematically adopt policies that retard financial
development, this should inhibit the entry of new firms to the domestic market-
place and may explain Rogowski and Kayser’s finding that countries with more
proportional electoral rules have higher price levels. In this sense our work is
also a natural complement to work by Scartascini (2002).
We wish to conclude by noting that adopting and enforcing insider trading
laws, while important, are nonetheless a relatively ‘‘cheap’’ form of investor pro-
tection. Indeed, part of insider trading laws’ attractiveness for our purposes is
that they do not directly impact corporate control, and are thus less susceptible
to the argument made prominent in varieties of capitalism literature, that
national economic outcomes may actually be better served, through reasons of
complementaries and path dependence, by ‘‘inefficient’’ policies. Convergence
on policies that do directly impact corporate control, such as changes in the way
boards of directors are selected, or the extent to which management may avail
themselves of various anti-takeover measures, have been slower going and have
not, as of yet, shown the same degree of convergence as insider trading laws.
Table 1 noted at the outset of this paper speaks to that, as do recent works by
Culpepper (forthcoming-a,b), Khanna, Kogan, and Palepu (2006) and others.
Nonetheless, we hope and suspect that the theoretical framework developed in
this paper will be a useful tool in understanding future developments in this
area.
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